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Expanding Terry1: Compulsory Identification in Hiibel
v.
Sixth Judicial District Court, Humbolt County2
[W]e are in danger of forgetting that the Bill of Rights reflects
experience with police excesses. It is not only under Nazi rule that
police excesses are inimical to freedom. It is easy to make light of
insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties
when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears
testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.3

- Justice Frankfurter
I. INTRODUCTION
The citizens of the United States enjoy the comfort and convenience
of being able to travel freely and enjoy a certain level of privacy while
doing so. They also enjoy, with some exceptions, the right to remain
silent when encountered by police officers. These freedoms, guaranteed
by the Fourth4 and Fifth Amendments5 to the United States Constitution,
are considered by many to be fundamental rights, not to be easily
encroached upon by the government.6

1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
3. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
6. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 477 (1928),
called the “the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
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Citizens of other nations, however, presently and throughout history,
have had to endure the threat of being arbitrarily stopped by government
agents who want nothing more than to harass and intimidate. The
menacing demand from law enforcement for “Your papers, please!” is a
hallmark of a police state. The Gestapo in Nazi Germany and the
Committee for State Security, or KGB, in the communist Soviet Union
bring to mind police checkpoints, demands for state-issued identification
papers, and the threat of imprisonment for anything less than total
compliance.7 These are images that, with the exception of wartime,
Americans have not had to endure on their own soil.8
While the Supreme Court has placed restrictions and limits on the
Fourth Amendment for the purpose of facilitating law enforcement
officers in their duties,9 this right to be free from “unreasonable searches
and seizures” has remained intact and is regarded, if not by the judiciary
then certainly by the citizenry, as a fundamental civil right.10 Civil
libertarians are put on alert when the government, either through
legislation or judicial interpretation, attempts to curtail the Fourth
Amendment in favor of increased police power.
Perhaps this is why the seemingly insignificant case of Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial District Court, Humbolt County11 has garnered so much
attention.12 In Hiibel, a Nevada rancher, Larry D. Hiibel, was charged
civilized men.” See also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) (Supreme Court refers to the
Fourth and Fifth amendments as “fundamental rights.” Id. at 936).
7. See generally Richard Vetterli & William E. Fort, Jr., THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, (1st
ed. 1968).
8. Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX.) noted that “[t]he principal tool for sustaining a police state, even
the most militant, is always economic control and punishment by denying disobedient citizens such
things as jobs or places to live, and by levying fines and imprisonment.” available at
http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2002/cr062702.htm.
9. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. Available at http://www.constitutioncenter.org/PressRoom/PressReleases/2002_09 _17
_1249.shtml. People polled in this 2002 survey found that “34 percent of Americans feel the right to
privacy is ‘basically safe.’ Four in 10 (41 percent) believe the right to privacy in America ‘is
currently under serious threat’ and 24 percent believe that the right has already been lost.”
Furthermore, “when asked whom they perceive poses the greatest threat to their personal privacy, 57
percent cite banks and credit card companies because of their ability to collect and sell marketing
information about consumers. The federal government was feared most by 29 percent, followed by
eight percent who fear law enforcement agencies.”
11. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
12. Since the holding in Hiibel in June 2004 until March 2005, the case has been cited in
numerous law review and journal pieces. See, e.g., Charles H. Whitebread, The Rule of Law, Judicial
Self-Restraint, and Unanswered Questions: Decisions of the Untied States Supreme Court’s 20032004 Term, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 101, 118 (2004); Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards:
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 717 (2004); Eric P. Haas, Back to the
Future? The Use of Biometrics, Its impact on Airport Security, and How this Technology Should be
Governed, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 459, 482 (2004); Hon. Robert L. Gottsfield, Taking the Fifth:
Avoiding the Cruel Trilemma, 41 ARIZ. ATT’Y 36 (2004); Jerry Brito, Relax Don’t Do It: Why Rfid
Privacy Concerns are Exaggerated and Legislation is Premature, UCLA J. L. TECH. 5 (2004); K. A.
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with a misdemeanor for obstructing an officer in his duties by refusing to
provide identification to the officer who had demanded it.13 For that,
Hiibel was arrested, jailed, charged, convicted, and ordered to pay a fine
of $250.14 Civil libertarian groups, both liberal and conservative,
embraced Hiibel’s cause.15
One reason for the concern of these usually divergent groups was the
fact that the Nevada state laws at issue16 seemed to contradict what the
United States Supreme Court had previously written regarding the
compulsive identification of those not meeting the “probable cause”
standard.17 Prior to Hiibel, police could inquire as to the identity of a
person who the officer reasonably suspected of a crime, but the officer
could not compel the person to answer.18 The Nevada laws seemed to fly
in the face of this “right to remain silent.” In addition, despite the
Supreme Court’s prior opinions on the issue, various individual states
had, over the years, enacted statutes that attached criminal penalties for
refusing to provide one’s name to law enforcement officers upon
demand.19
In this post-September 11 world it seems that such intrusion into our
privacy is not only becoming more common, but is even welcomed by a
Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and
the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 123 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O.
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 n103 (2004); Marc Rotenberg,
Restoring a Public Interest Vision of Law in the Age of the Internet, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 7
(2004); M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel; The Criminalization of Silence, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 357 (2004); Margaret Paris & Andrew E. Taslitz, Catering to the Constable: The Court’s
Latest Fourth Amendment Cases Give the Nod to Police, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2004); Meghan S.
Skelton & James G. Connell, III, The Routine Booking Question, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 55, 74 (2004);
Peter Bowman Rutledge & Nicole L. Angarella, An End of Term Exam: October Term 2003 at the
Supreme Court of the United States, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 151, 171 (2004); Shaun B. Spencer,
Nevada Case Threatens to Expand Terry Stops, 48 B. BAR J. 27 (2004); Tracey Maclin, The Pringle
Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2004
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395 (2004). In addition, newspapers and magazines across the country wrote
articles and editorials regarding the Hiibel case, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold a Nevada
Law Requiring Citizens to Identify Themselves to the Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004,at A16;
Richard Willing, What’s in a Name? Too Much, Court Told, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2004 at 3A;
Sean Whaley, Fourth, Fifth Amendments: U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Rancher’s Case, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Mar. 2, 2004 at 2B.
13. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
14. Id.
15. For Larry D. Hiibel amicus briefs were submitted by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, the Cato Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty, Privacyactivism, Cyber Privacy Project, freetotravel.org, John Gilmore (a
noted civil libertarian who is currently suing John Ashcroft for refusing him the right to travel
without showing identification) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
16. NEV. REV. STAT. §199.280 (2002), NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2001)
17. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
34 (1968).
18. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439.
19. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
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large portion of the citizenry. A recent survey found that seventy-four
percent of those polled “feel highly or somewhat reassured by having
surveillance cameras in public places”20 while seventy-two “percent feel
reassured by having cameras in and around private property.”21 While a
video camera in a public place may not necessarily violate the Fourth
Amendment, this docile encroachment, and the willingness of the
citizenry to accept it, is a step towards the slippery slope to a police
state.22
This Note will attempt to show why the decision in Hiibel was
flawed and why the ramifications of the decision may be detrimental to
American citizens’ constitutional rights. Part II of this Note provides a
brief background of the jurisprudence for both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Part III lays out the facts of the Hiibel case and reviews
the reasoning of the Court in reaching its decision. Part IV analyzes the
Court’s decision, raising points that address the strengths and weaknesses
of the Court’s rationale as well as the implications of its decision. The
Note concludes with a discussion of the possible ramifications of the
Hiibel Court’s decision.
II. BACKGROUND FOR FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment restricts the government’s power of search
and seizure, and had originally been held to apply to the home of the
individual.23 However, the Amendment, with all of the attention that it
receives in modern criminal courts, lay virtually dormant for the first one
hundred and ten years of the United States’ existence.24 Not until 1914,

20. Melanie C. Johnson, Voting Yes on Being Watched, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, CA.), Dec. 20, 2004, at A01. (“[S]upport of security cameras in public places is
widespread with 90 percent [polled] saying they are appropriate in airports, 85 percent supporting
them in parking lots, and 65 percent in favor of them in the workplace, said Ann Lindstrom, an ADT
spokeswoman. About 65 percent of those tallied support cameras on city streets and 88 percent favor
them in stores and government buildings.”).
21. Id.
22. Justice Douglas, dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 (1971) (an
electronic eavesdropping case), stated that “electronic surveillance . . . uncontrolled, promises to lead
us into a police state.” Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights in Klass v. F.R.G., 2
European Human Rights Rep. 214, 231 (1979), noted that “[p]owers of secret surveillance of
citizens, characteriz[e] . . . the police state.”
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 2
(1975).
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in Weeks v. United States,25 did the Supreme Court begin to recognize
the applicability of the Amendment to federal law enforcement officers.26
In Weeks, local police officers, followed by a federal marshal, entered
and took documents from the defendant’s home.27 The Supreme Court
ruled that the items obtained by the federal marshal needed to be returned
to the defendant and could not be used against him.28 However, the Court
held that the documents taken by the local law enforcement officers did
not have to be returned since the Fourth Amendment’s reach was limited
to the “Federal Government and its agencies.”29
State officials did not remain exempt from Fourth Amendment
restrictions for long however. Following some intermediary decisions
where the Supreme Court held that the states could choose to apply the
Fourth Amendment to local law enforcement,30 the Court in Mapp v.
Ohio31 held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable against all states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Court in Katz v. United
States33 went a step further in securing the rights of the individual by
holding that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”34
thereby providing additional protections to people while outside of their
homes. However, the Court, in Elkins v. United States, recognized that
the individual’s right to privacy must sometimes be balanced against
governmental interest in providing security for the citizenry.35 The Court
noted, “what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.”36 It applied this balancing test, that
of individual privacy concerns against compelling governmental interests
found in Elkins, to the Fourth Amendment when it decided Terry v.
Ohio,37 arguably the most influential and well-known Fourth
Amendment case in the history of the Supreme Court.
In Terry, the question before the Court was “whether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. GRISWOLD, supra note 24 at 3.
27. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
28. Id. at 398.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. Id. at 655.
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Id. at 351.
35. 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (defendants, after having their conviction for wiretapping
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, were granted their motion to suppress by the Supreme
Court, because the search by state officers was illegal and therefore, the evidence was inadmissible
in a federal court).
36. Id.
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for arrest.”38 A
police officer searched some young men on a public street that he
deemed to be “suspicious.”39 He found that one of the men had a pistol
under his jacket.40 The Court held that, even where the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure,
the frisk for weapons that could harm the officer or other individuals is
permissible.41 The Court thereby applied the privacy balancing test and
found in favor of allowing the warrantless search because of the
government’s compelling interest in protecting officers from bodily
harm.42
Terry is relevant to Hiibel because the concurring opinion of Justice
White addresses the question, at least in dictum, that brought Hiibel
before the Court in the first place. Justice White noted that:
[G]iven the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to
me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent
questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to
answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the
officer to the need for continued observation.43

Terry is not the only case where the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of compulsory responses, even if only as an ancillary matter. In
Berkemer v. McCarty,44 the Court addressed whether an officer violated
a motorist’s Fifth Amendment rights during a traffic stop. The Court, in
its explanation of why a traffic stop is not subject to the Miranda rules
governing other types of custodial stops, noted that the traffic stop is
analogous to the so-called “Terry stop.”45 Quoting Terry, the Court
noted:
[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation.” Typically, this means that the officer
may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the

38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 6. The men had been loitering and pacing in front of a store window for several
minutes. The officer thought they might have been “casing a job, a stick-up.” Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 30.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
44. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
45. Id. at 437-39.
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officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond.46

As noted above, the Court’s decisions over the past thirty-six years,
while not addressing the issue of compulsory identification head-on,
have provided direction for what is and what is not permissible in
citizen-police encounters. The Hiibel Court used the first part of this
jurisprudential analysis to guide its decision regarding compulsory
identification.47
B. Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fifth Amendment,48 specifically the portion that prevents selfincrimination has a long rich history dating back to at least the thirteenth
century.49 The original self-incrimination clause in the Virginia State
Constitution stated that “no man could be ‘compelled to give evidence
against himself.50’” Some have argued, including the respondents in
Hiibel, that requiring one to identify himself in the course of an
encounter with law enforcement is “non-testimonial.”51 As such, it would
not be covered by the Fifth Amendment. However, the Court’s
jurisprudence has developed such that it has held that any
communications which could be “testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled” are covered by Fifth Amendment protections.52 The Fifth
Amendment was eventually incorporated against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by way of Malloy v.
Hogan.53
The most important Fifth Amendment case regarding detainees is
Miranda v. Arizona.54 In Miranda, the Court held that “[p]rior to any
questioning, the [suspect] must be warned that he has the right to remain

46. Id. at 439-40 (emphasis in original).
47. See generally, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (the privacy v. compelling
governmental interest test).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 1, 3 (1980).
50. Id. at 22 (citing the Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 8 (1776) as found in 7 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3813
(Francis Thorpe ed., W.S. Hein 1993) (1909)) (The original clause was drafted by George Mason).
51. See Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County,
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
52. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2460 (2004)
(citing United States v. Hubbel, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000)).
53. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (after refusing to answer questions regarding a gambling operation,
the defendant was charged with contempt. The Supreme Court held that the defendant had properly
invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and that it was thus incorporated against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney . . . .”55 The
Court made clear, however, that Miranda rights were limited to custodial
interrogations.56 Custody status is only achieved following an arrest for
probable cause.57 Subsequent decisions bolster that interpretation.58 The
Court has not squarely addressed whether a citizen who is not in a
custodial interrogation has the right to remain silent. In the shadow of
such precedents, the Court granted certiorari to Hiibel.
III. THE FACTS OF HIIBEL
On May 21, 2000, Deputy Lee Dove, of the Humbolt County,
Nevada Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to follow up on an anonymous
report made by a concerned citizen.59 The citizen reported seeing
someone striking a female passenger inside a pickup truck while the
truck was parked along a rural roadway.60 Upon arriving at the scene,
Deputy Dove observed a male standing beside a pickup truck, with a
female sitting in the passenger seat. The male was Larry D. Hiibel and
the female was his teenage daughter, Mimi Hiibel. Deputy Dove
observed Mr. Hiibel and noted that based on Mr. Hiibel’s eyes,
mannerisms, speech, and odor, Mr. Hiibel might be intoxicated.61 The
deputy’s dash-cam captured the entire incident.62

55. Id. at 444.
56. Id. (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.”)
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). (This differs from one who is simply being detained,
under reasonable suspicion, for questioning).
58. See generally Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (The Court held that IRS
agents interrogating a suspect in the suspect’s home are not constrained by Miranda as the encounter
is not custodial in nature); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (The defendant had
voluntarily gone to the police station, was told he was not under arrest, and then confessed to the
crime. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody because he was not deprived
of freedom of action in any significant way and that he was not subject to Miranda protections).
59. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
60. Id.
61. The dash-cam video and written transcript may be accessed online at
http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html.
62. Id. Whereas some of the audio of the dash-cam is muffled, unintelligible or otherwise
undecipherable, it is so stated. The written transcript of the dash-cam video encounter, when
compared to the video itself, appears to have some discrepancies. The following transcript is the
author’s own best transcription of the dash-cam video. First, Deputy Dove arrives on the scene and
encounters Larry Hiibel. Mr. Hiibel then engages the officer:
Hiibel: How’s it going sheriff?
Deputy: How you doin’?
Hiibel: (unintelligible)
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Deputy: Well?
Hiibel: Looks like I’m parked okay . . .
Deputy: Well, I got a report that there’s been a fight going on between you two tonight.
Hiibel: Well, I don’t know about that . . .
Deputy: Why don’t you come over here with me . . .
Hiibel: I’m parked on the side of the road . . . (unintelligible) . . .
Deputy: You’ve got any identification on you?
Hiibel: No, why should I have any I.D.?
Deputy: The thing of it is . . .we’re conducting an investigation, okay, and I need to see some
identification.
Hiibel: Naw, I just suppose you take me to jail.
Deputy: I need to see some identification.
Hiibel: I don’t, I don’t think I’ve . . .
Deputy: Sir, come here.
Hiibel: Sir, don’t grab onto me . . .
Deputy: I won’t grab you if you’ll come back over here. Come over here, come here.
Hiibel: Alright, fine, I’m over here. Am I off the road?
Deputy: I need to see some identification.
Hiibel: Why?
Deputy: Because I’m conducting an investigation.
Hiibel: Investigating what?
Deputy: I’m investigating . . .
Hiibel: Am I legal? I’m illegal? I am . . . am I illegally parked?
Deputy: How much alcohol have you had to drink?
Hiibel: That don’t matter . . . is it against the law to drink?
Deputy: It could be a searchable situation . . .
Hiibel: Okay then, take me to jail.
Deputy: I didn’t say that.
Hiibel: Alright then. I’m not illegally parked . . .
Deputy: Okay . . .
Hiibel: I wanna know what I’m charged with.
Deputy: I’m . . . you’re not being charged with anything. I’m conducting an investigation.
Hiibel: I don’t know what you want with me . . .
Deputy: I’m conducting an investigation . . .
Hiibel: Why?
Deputy: Because I want to find out who you are and I want to find out what I got going on here.
Hiibel: (unintelligible)
Deputy: Let me see your identification.
Hiibel: Take me to jail.
Deputy: Let me see your identification.
Hiibel: No.
Deputy: Show me your identification.
Hiibel: Go ahead and, and cuff me.
Deputy: Let me see your identification.
Hiibel: I’m being . . . I’m um being cooperative with you . . . I . . . I
Deputy: Let me see some I.D.
Hiibel: I’m cooperating.
Deputy: Let me see some I.D.
Hiibel: Cuff me and take me to jail.
Deputy: Let me see some I.D. then we’ll talk okay?
Hiibel: I don’t want to talk . . .(unintelligible) . . . I’ve broke no laws, take me to jail, I don’t care.
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Deputy Dove asked or demanded to see “identification” from Mr.
Hiibel, making such a demand eleven times. Not once was Mr. Hiibel
asked to state his name or to verbally identify himself. Mr. Hiibel was
convicted of a misdemeanor, that of resisting a public officer in violation
of Nevada Revised Statutes 199.280.63
Mr. Hiibel unsuccessfully appealed his misdemeanor conviction to
the Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the
County of Humbolt.64 He then filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the State of Nevada.65 In that petition, Mr. Hiibel requested the
court declare unconstitutional the portion of Nevada Revised
Statutes.171.123 that requires persons who are subject to a Terry stop to
identify themselves.66 The Nevada Supreme Court was split in its
Deputy: Why would I, why would I take you to jail if you haven’t done anything?
Hiibel: Because you wanna apparently. I’m not illegally parked, I’m not doin’ nothin’, now you’ve
got a guy behind me . . . go ahead and take me to jail.
Deputy: Let me see some I.D.
Hiibel: Why?
Deputy: Because.
Hiibel: Why?
Deputy: You’re facing arrest here if I don’t get some identification and cooperation.
Hiibel: Go ahead and arrest me. I don’t care.
Deputy: You’re not going to cooperate?
Hiibel: Because I’ve done nothin’ wrong.
Deputy: Okay, you’re not going to cooperate with me at all?
Hiibel: No.
Deputy: Okay, turn around, put your hands behind your back, spread your feet. Spread you feet
wider. Thank you sir. Okay, I’m gonna take you back to the patrol car here in a second. You got
anything that is going to stick, poke or hurt me?
Hiibel: Knife.
Deputy: Okay, I’m gonna take your knife and you’ll get it back at a later time.
Hiibel: Yes.
63. NEV. REV. STAT. 199.280 (2002) reads, in pertinent part:
A person who, in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise specially provided
for, willfully resists, delays, or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to
discharge any legal duty of his office shall be punished . . . where no dangerous weapon
is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction, or delay, for a misdemeanor.
The basis for the conviction was that Mr. Hiibel, during a Terry stop, had failed to identify himself
to a police officer upon request, in violation of NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2001) which reads in
pertinent part:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a crime . . . 3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this
section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be
compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
Id.
64. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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decision to uphold the statute.67 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari on October 20, 2003.68 The Court, by a 5-4 vote,
upheld the conviction on both Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment
analyses, with Justice Stevens dissenting and Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Ginsburg joining in a separate dissent.69 A petition for a rehearing was
filed, but also denied on August 23, 2004.70
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis
The Court held that the process of asking questions is an essential
part of police investigations and that an officer, with reasonable
suspicion of an individual, has the right to detain a person to investigate
the matter more fully.71 The Court noted that several states have, in their
criminal code, “stop and identify” statutes.72 While these statutes vary
somewhat in their approach, “all permit an officer to ask for, or require a
suspect to disclose, his identity.”73 As long as the Terry stop is limited
and the officer’s action is “reasonably justified at its inception and
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place” the officer is permitted to demand the
person’s name.74
The Court indicated that the oft-referenced “balancing test” between
the individual’s right to privacy and the government’s compelling
interest leans in favor of the “strong government interest in solving
67. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 868 (Nev. 2002) (The court was split four
to three on Hiibel.) Interestingly enough, much of the argument the majority relied upon related to
the war on terror and the government’s need to know with whom it is dealing. Id. at 874. The dissent
refuted that argument and noted that the precarious time in our country’s history is “precisely the
time when our duty to vigilantly guard the rights enumerated in the Constitution becomes most
important.” Id. at 880.
68. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct, 540 U.S. 965 (2003).
69. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2457, 2460
(2004).
70. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humboldt County, 125 S. Ct. 18 (2004).
71. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
72. Id. at 2546. See ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6) (2003); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 856.021(2) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/107-14 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) (2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A)
(2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 84.710(2) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2003); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-829 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3
(2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.50(1) (Consol. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1983
(2003); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2003).
73. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2546.
74. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)).
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crimes and bringing offenders to justice.”75 The Court found that
knowledge of identity also serves the government’s interests in providing
officer safety, where the officer may discover the individual has
outstanding warrants or has a record of violence or a mental disorder.76
The Court also observed that where the police are investigating cases of
domestic assault knowledge of identity is particularly important to assess
the situation, the threat to the officer’s safety, and the possible danger to
the potential victim.77
The Court noted that it had previously addressed the issue of whether
a person could be compelled to identify himself to an officer who had
less than probable cause.78 However, it dismissed its prior analyses as
“dicta” and declined to be bound by them.79 The Court distinguished
Hiibel from the issues in those cases by stating that the previous cases
dealt with Fourth Amendment issues and the rights that citizens have
against the government.80 Mr. Hiibel’s obligation to reveal his name
arose out of Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment.81
The Court expanded the scope of Terry, permitting “a State to
require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop” (a
stop predicated on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause).82 To justify
the expansion of Terry, the Court invoked the privacy balancing test
stating, “[t]he request for identi[fication] has an immediate relation to the
purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of
criminal sanction helps to ensure that the request for identity does not
become a legal nullity.”83 As the duration of the Terry stop is kept short,
the nature of the stop is not altered by the statute and does not violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of the individual.84
According to the Court, the petitioner’s concerns of arbitrary police
stops followed by arrests for “being suspicious” are unwarranted.85 The
Court noted Terry stops are guided by strong principles, namely that the
“stop [must] be justified at its inception and be ‘reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified’ the initial stop.”86 In other
75. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2546. (citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985)).
76. Id. at 2546.
77. Id.
78. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53
n.3 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
79. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2454.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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words, “[the] officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify
himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop.”87
B. Fifth Amendment Analysis
The Court recognized that for a communication to qualify for Fifth
Amendment privilege, the “communication must be testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled.”88 While the respondents argued that the
disclosing of one’s identity did not qualify as “testimonial,” the Court
held that disclosures of identity may indeed be testimonial, but did not
make a definitive ruling on that issue.89 The Court avoided this issue
because it found that the mere disclosure of one’s name presented no
reasonable danger of incrimination.90 The Court reasoned that since the
disclosure of one’s name is not per se incriminating, meaning that if “the
answer of the witness will not directly show his infamy, but only tends to
disgrace him, he is bound to answer.”91 Since Hiibel’s name alone would
not incriminate him, it was not protected by the privilege.92
Perplexingly, the Court seemed to expand Fifth Amendment
protections by citing Kastigar v. United States.93 According to Kastigar,
the Fifth Amendment privilege “protects against any disclosures that the
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might so be used.”94
The Court held that the petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name “was
not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name
would be used to incriminate him, or that it ‘would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence used to prosecute’ him.”95 The petitioner had simply
“not explain[ed] how the disclosure of his name could have been used
against him in a criminal case.”96
The Court minimized the importance of the disclosure of one’s
identity “in the scheme of things” so as only to be significant in “unusual
circumstances.”97 The Court did note that a case may arise where a

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 2460.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896)).
Id. at 2460.
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460 (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
Id.
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person, in the course of a Terry stop, fears that providing his name to the
police may give them “a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict
the individual of a separate offense,” and the Court can then decide if the
Fifth Amendment privilege applies and what remedy must follow.98
Thus, the Court declined to decide that issue definitively in Hiibel.99
C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that even with the Nevada
legislature curtailing the statute to compel only disclosure of the
suspect’s name it still violated the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.100
Fifth Amendment protections are “directed squarely” at those that are
under the scrutiny of the government for a criminal investigation and
therefore any person who is being questioned by the police under
“reasonable suspicion” has a right to refuse to provide information to the
police.101 The Fifth Amendment’s protections apply in Terry stops,
where the “officer’s inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the
justification for [the stop’s] initiation.”102 Justice Stevens noted the
Berkemer Court’s analysis that the “detainee is not obliged to respond”
to an officer’s inquiry into the suspect’s identity.103 He also noted that
generally, the Court’s prior decisions have not required a person to
provide an officer with his name or face arrest.104 Justice Stevens wrote,
“it is no surprise that petitioner assumed, as have we, that he had a right
not to disclose his identity.”105
Justice Stevens also contests that, despite the majority’s refusal to
answer the question, the communication was in fact testimonial.106 In
Doe v. United States,107 the Court found that a “testimonial
communication” is the “‘extortion of information from the accused’, the

98. Id. See also Petition for Rehearing at 3, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt
County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
99. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
100. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2462.
102. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
103. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2464.
107. 487 U.S. 201, (1988). (Doe found that a suspect of a grand jury investigation can be
compelled by the court to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts, without
acknowledging the existence of those documents, without violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
214).
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attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind’ that
implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause.”108 Justice Stevens also noted
that the Court had recently decided that “[w]hatever else the term
[‘testimonial’] covers, it applies at a minimum . . . to police
interrogations.”109
Justice Stevens noted that the majority focused on the “incrimination
factor” of the communication to find that it is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment.110 He reminded the majority that the Court has found that
“[c]ompelled testimony that communicates information that may ‘lead to
incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the information itself is not
inculpatory.”111 Justice Stevens then posed the question: Why would an
officer ask a person’s name if not to incriminate him or provide a link in
the chain of evidence?112 Further, “why else would the Nevada
Legislature require its disclosure only when circumstances ‘reasonably
indicate that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime?113 If the Court is correct, then petitioner’s refusal to
cooperate did not impede the police investigation, . . . [the statute]
requires nothing more than a useless invasion of privacy.”114 The fact
that the officer will use that information provided to him to compare it to
a database and ultimately use that information in a criminal prosecution
demonstrates the importance of the person’s name to the police and the
citizen’s interest in not providing it to the them.115
2. Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg
The remaining dissenting Justices began their analysis by noting that
the Terry case, while allowing for “stop and frisk” searches, was
conditional upon “reasonable suspicion.”116 Furthermore, Justice White,
in that same opinion, wrote that “answers [to questions by the police to a
suspect], may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis
for arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation.”117 The dissent noted that, ten years after Terry, the Court
had declined to answer the question of “what’s the State’s interest in

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 211).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004)).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2463.
Id. at 2464 (citing, ultimately, Doe, 487 U.S. at 208 n.6).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464.
Id. See also NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123(1) (2001).
Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464.
Id.
Id. at 2465.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)) (White, J., concurring).
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putting a man in jail because he does not want to answer” when asked to
identify himself.118 Five years later, the Berkemer Court held that, while
the police may detain a suspect to try and obtain more information, the
person is “not obliged to respond.”119 In 1983, in Kolender v. Lawson,120
Justice Brennen’s concurrence stated that a Terry suspect “must be free
to decline to answer the questions put to him.”121 As recently as 2000, the
Court held that “allowing officers to stop and question a fleeing person
‘is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or
to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.’”122
The dissenting Justices argued further that these statements, which
have stood for the past twenty years, are the type that the legal
community typically takes as statements of law.123 They postulated that
the efforts of law enforcement have been considerably hampered by
these long-standing rules and the dissenting Justices saw no need to
change that now.124
V. ANALYSIS
A. “Your papers please!”: To I.D., or Not to I.D.
While there has been a considerable debate about the
constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes 171.123(3), it may be
“much ado about nothing.” When the facts of Hiibel are scrutinized, it
can be found that there is not a constitutional issue. It appears that Larry
D. Hiibel did not even violate the statute in the first place.125
In an attempt to rebuff Mr. Hiibel’s assertions that the government’s
purpose in upholding this law essentially advocates the implementation
of a “national identification system,”126 the respondents contended that
the government does not require the production of a driver’s license or
118. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979)).
119. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
120. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
121. Id.
122. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Illinois v. Wardow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
123. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465.
124. Id.
125. NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123(3) (2001) reads in pertinent part:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit, a crime . . . 3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this
section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be
compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
126. Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124
S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
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presumably any other written form of identification by a person detained
under reasonable suspicion.127 The Respondents noted that:
This requirement [to hold a written form of identification] reduces the
person’s discretion as to how he or she chooses to comply with Nev.
Rev. Stat. 171.123(3). In addition, it is more intrusive than merely
requiring a person to state their name to an officer. Allowing the
person to choose how to comply with this requirement maintains a
correct balance between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.128

The majority opinion seemed to concur when it stated:
[a]s we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the
officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the
suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other
means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is
satisfied and no violation occurs.129

Under the Court’s and the State of Nevada’s mutual understanding,
Nevada Revised Statutes 171.123(3) requires the suspect to state his
name if asked for it by law enforcement, but the statute does not
explicitly provide that the suspect must produce identification for law
enforcement.
A review of the dialogue between Deputy Dove and Mr. Hiibel
reveals that Deputy Dove did not afford Mr. Hiibel the opportunity to
identify himself by simply stating his name.130 Instead, Deputy Dove
demanded eleven times, to “see some I.D.,” to be “show[n] some
identification” or “risk being arrested.”131 In Mr. Hiibel’s Petition for a
Rehearing, he argued, inter alia, that the statute did not require him to
produce identification to the officer, but rather to state his name if so
demanded by the officer.132 Deputy Lee Dove never demanded to know
Mr. Hiibel’s name. Unfortunately, the issue was never addressed by the
Court as the petition for a rehearing was denied.133
While the facts of this case may have been erroneously applied, the
Court chose to rule on whether to expand the government’s privacy
127. Brief for Respondent at 33, Id.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.
130. See supra note 62.
131. Id.
132. Petition for Rehearing at 4, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
133. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 125 S. Ct. 18 (2004).
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balancing test. The fact that the Court may have answered a question that
was errantly postulated does not diminish the significance or the strength
of the Court’s decision regarding the “balancing test” and Terry.134
B. The Fourth Amendment Question
1. The “balancing test”
The majority set the standard that “an officer may not arrest a
suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is
not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.”135 In
other words, the reasons for the Terry stop itself must necessitate the
officer’s knowledge of a person’s identity for the officer to have grounds
to apply, for example, Nevada Revised Statutes 171.123(3) and have
grounds to arrest him for failure to identify himself.
This rationale is somewhat problematic. First, it requires the officer
to inform the suspect of the reasons for the stop. Second, the officer must
allow the suspect to decide for himself whether his identity is necessary
knowledge for the officer’s investigation into the matter as it was
explained to him by the officer. Third, even if the layperson suspect is
able to navigate this morass of legal complexity, it is difficult to think of
a situation in which a person’s identity would not be useful to the officer
in his encounter with the suspect. The Court provided some examples of
such usefulness such as a warrant check or to see if the suspect had a
history of violence or mental disorders.136 However, these reasons are
themselves problematic, as even the Court’s own examples cannot meet
this new Hiibel standard.
2. Warrant check
The standard for compulsive identification is that “an officer may not
arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for
identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the
stop.”137 This standard is based on the fact that knowledge of the
suspect’s identity serves “important government interests.”138 The Court
134. “The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined ‘by
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate government interests.’” Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979)).
135. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
136. Id. at 2458.
137. Id. at 2459.
138. Id. at 2458.
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uses the example of discovery of outstanding warrants as being an
important government interest that would justify the compulsory
identification.139 While there is no doubt that discovery of outstanding
warrants serves an important government interest, the question is
whether a warrant search meets the standard.
An example serves to illustrate the point. A hypothetical police
officer receives a call over his radio that a convenience store has just
been robbed at gunpoint. The store clerk obtained a good description of
the suspect and the description is dispatched to the officer. Moments later
the officer sees a man matching the suspect’s description walking away
from the direction of the convenience store. The officer stops the man.
What may the officer do to further his investigation of the crime? The
suspect is most likely armed and therefore it is reasonable for the officer
to conduct a “felony” or “high-risk” stop, draw his service weapon, and
demand that the suspect render himself compliant to the officer’s
demands. The officer may also conduct a Terry frisk for weapons. But,
under the ruling of the majority, the officer may not compel the suspect
to identify himself. Even if the officer wants to run the suspect’s name
for warrants, “an important government interest,” he may not demand the
name because the warrant check has nothing to do with the robbery,
which was the reason for the initial stop. Unless the store clerk was
familiar with the suspect and could provide the officer with his name,140
any demand for the name would be, as the dissent called it, “nothing
more than a useless invasion of privacy.”141 On this point, at least, the
majority and dissent seem to agree.
Under this standard, an officer may not demand a person to reveal
their name simply because the officer would like to see if he can find an
outstanding warrant. When a person is under reasonable suspicion for
criminal activity, a warrant search is not going to reveal to the officer any
information that will further his investigation into that particular
criminal event. Even if it does reveal information that is pertinent to the
investigation, the Fifth Amendment privilege would then apply. Therein
lies a constitutional “Catch-22.” The suspect cannot be required to
furnish information to the police that will further an investigation and
incriminate the suspect.
3. Officer safety
In situations where the suspect’s identity is not important to the
139. Id.
140. E.g., “I was robbed by one of my customers, his name is Robert.”
141. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464.
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investigation at hand an “officer safety reason” may be invoked by the
police officer to require the suspect to furnish his name. The Court noted
that a person’s criminal record might reveal a history of violence that
could be useful to the officers in maintaining their own safety.142
This argument fails on two points. First, it is a “catch-all” and
essentially eviscerates any distinction the Court meant to draw when
establishing an officer’s rights to know a suspect’s identity. Every
situation in which an officer comes into contact with a potential lawbreaker or anyone else for that matter, the officer is faced with a potential
safety risk and thus can justify demanding the individual’s name. The
privacy versus compelling government interest balancing test becomes
moot if everyone has their name processed for warrants in the name of
“officer safety.”
Second, while a history of violence is a better predictor than nothing
at all, a history of violence is anything but conclusive. Even mental
health professionals conducting in-depth psychological analysis of their
patients are wrong in their predictions of violence two out of three
times.143 Even the psychological tests used in the screening process of
police officers themselves have had limited success in predicting
violence.144 A history of violence does not compel the suspect to lash out
at the officer without control. The converse is also true: the absence of a
history of violence or aggression does not guarantee the officer’s safety
in that particular moment.
In Hiibel, Deputy Dove was in close contact with Larry D. Hiibel for
approximately two minutes and ten seconds before the deputy placed him
under arrest.145 The deputy should have done a Terry frisk for weapons if
the deputy truly feared for his safety. Instead, Deputy Dove demanded
identification from Mr. Hiibel. The Court has long allowed this type of
“pat-down” search to protect the officer from potential danger.146
Ironically, if Deputy Dove had performed this search, he would have
discovered the knife that Mr. Hiibel had in his pocket.
However, it would appear from Deputy Dove’s actions on the dashcam video that the primary reason for his demand of identification was
not because he feared for his safety. The purpose of his demand for
identification was that he wanted to “find out who [Mr. Hiibel was]” and

142. Id. at 2458.
143. Miguel A. Medez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: People Do Not Seem to Be
Predictable Characters, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 876 (1988).
144. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 462 (2004).
145. Available at http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html.
146. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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to find out “what we got going on here.”147 The same can be generalized
to the majority of other Terry stops. Knowledge of a person’s name is
simply a search for a possible threat, whereas searching a person for
weapons is a search for a probable threat.
The balancing test devised by the Court, namely balancing the
security of the officer and the community against the privacy of the
individual, is based on this notion of possible versus probable. While
violence against an officer is possible in any encounter with members of
the public, the question remains, does reasonable suspicion give rise to
the probability of a threat? If not, should officers be allowed to intrude
upon the privacy interests of the individual based on mere possibilities?
If the Court meant to answer this question with its decision in Hiibel,
then American citizens truly have reason to fear for their privacy
interests. Such reasoning could, with the proper impetus or tragic event
like that of September 11 lead the Court to allow even more intrusive and
sweeping legislation to take effect. Today the constitutionality of having
to divulge one’s name when under reasonable suspicion is argued,
tomorrow it may be an argument about preventing compulsive DNA
sampling of the general public by government agencies under a standard
even less than that of reasonable suspicion.148
C. The Fifth Amendment Question
The majority held that for a communication to be afforded Fifth
Amendment protection, it must be “testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled.”149 Mr. Hibbel’s communication met all three
requirements.150 As there is no question that the statute compels a suspect
to reveal his name to the officer,151 the analysis will focus primarily upon
the first two prongs of the test.
1. Is the communication testimonial?
The majority’s opinion does not rule out the possibility that an
officer’s compelling a suspect to reveal his identity is considered

147. See supra note 62.
148. Recently, in the small town of Truro, Massachusetts, police have asked all the local men
in the town to voluntarily submit to DNA sampling to help solve a three year old murder. “DNA
sweeps” are rare so far in the United States, but Britain has had 292 since 1987 and Germany boasts
the largest sweep, 16,000 men, in 1998. Amanda Ripley, The DNA Dragnet, To find a killer, a town
asks all its men to give a sample. Savvy policing or invasion of privacy?, TIME, Jan. 24, 2005, at 39.
149. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460, (citing United States v. Hubbel, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000)).
150. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
151. See NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123(3) (2001).
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testimonial.152 The majority concedes that to qualify as testimonial the
communication “must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual
assertion or disclose information.”153 A person’s name certainly qualifies
as “factual information” that is “disclosed.”
Justice Stevens contended that the demand for a person’s name is
testimonial.154 He noted that the standard stated by the majority for
Fourth Amendment Terry stops, that of the officer’s inquiry being
reasonably related in scope to the justification for [the stop’s] initiation,
is what grants Fifth Amendment protections to those interrogated by the
police under mere suspicion.155 The suspect is not required to respond to
the officer’s inquiries to determine his identity.156 This has long been the
standard held by the Court.157
The demand for a person’s name is testimonial. It requires a person
to divulge personal information of a factual nature. Information that is
not testimonial does not necessarily have a foundation in truth. But a
person’s name is a fact that may be used against them. If there is any
doubt as to the testimonial nature of one’s name, on need only examine
the various state statutes for providing a false name to a law enforcement
officer.158
2. Incrimination
The Justices agree that being compelled to identify one’s self is, at
the very least, plausibly testimonial.159 Where they differ is in the notion
of incrimination. The majority conceded that this prong was fact
sensitive and that each situation would be different, but did not rule out
the possibility of one’s name being incriminating.160 Justice Stevens
questioned why a police officer would want a person’s name if not to use

152. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
153. Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).
154. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2462.
155. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
156. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2462.
157. This proposition was first put forth in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
158. Most, if not all, states have criminalized the act of providing a false name to a police
officer. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-25 (2003). (A person who gives a false name, address, or date
of birth to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties with the intent of
misleading the officer as to his identity or birth date is guilty of a misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ch.
901.36 (1999) (It is unlawful for a person who has been arrested or lawfully detained by a law
enforcement officer to give a false name, or otherwise falsely identify himself or herself in any way,
to the law enforcement officer or any county jail personnel. . . . any person who violates this . . .
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree).
159. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460, 2463.
160. Id. at 2461.
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it against him in some fashion.161
But perhaps what is most bothersome about both the majority and the
dissenting opinions is that neither recognizes that Mr. Hiibel had, in fact,
real reason to fear that the police would use his own name against him.
Both the petitioner’s brief and petition for a rehearing state that Mr.
Hiibel’s name could have been used to implicate him in the crime of
domestic battery.162 Given that he and his minor daughter share the same
last name, providing his name to the deputy would have given the deputy
information that could have then been used against Mr. Hiibel for the
prosecution of the crime of domestic battery or child abuse. Neither the
majority nor the dissent acknowledges this fact.
D. What’s in a Name? Why Hiibel’s Struggle for Anonymity is
Important.
Some may fail to see the importance of Mr. Hiibel’s struggle to
maintain his right to refuse to produce identification. The police
discovered Mr. Hiibel’s name anyway and had they chosen to charge him
with the crimes of domestic battery or child abuse they could have then
used that information against him. The point, then, may seem moot.
However, Mr. Hiibel’s argument is grounded in sound constitutional
principles. The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and
the right to remain silent are simple, powerful human rights that should
not be curtailed. The State of Nevada’s compulsory identification statute
represents a dangerous encroachment on Fourth Amendment rights. This
expansion of police powers under Terry is not something that should be
easily dismissed by concerned citizens. For as police powers expand,
liberties diminish.
This expansion of the Terry doctrine fundamentally alters the citizenpolice relationship. No longer is a citizen under mere suspicion free to
remain silent in the face of police interrogation. He must fully cooperate
with the police until such a time as he has sufficiently condemned
himself and the police have probable cause to arrest him. Only then may
he exercise his right to remain silent. The amicus brief of the Cato
Institute163 noted that this irony was not lost on Judge Prettyman in
161. Id. at 2464.
162. Petition for Rehearing at 3, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004) (No.03-5554). See also NEV. REV. STAT. 33.018 (2003) (noting acts which
constitute domestic violence).
163. “The Cato Institute seeks to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to allow
consideration of the traditional American principles of limited government, individual liberty, free
markets and peace. Toward that goal, the Institute strives to achieve greater involvement of the
intelligent, concerned lay public in questions of policy and the proper role of government.” Available
at http://www.cato.org/about/about.html.
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District of Columbia v. Little.164 Judge Prettyman noted that to say that a
citizen who is suspected of a crime has the right to remain silent, but that
a citizen who is not suspected of a crime has no such right is a “fantastic
absurdity.”165 Hiibel, like many citizens who encounter police, found
himself in that twilight zone of legal protection: caught between innocent
bystander and suspect. In the hazy legal realm of “reasonable suspicion”
the Court found that, despite it being “a fantastic absurdity,” the right to
remain silent does not apply to those under reasonable suspicion.166
VI. CONCLUSION
While civil libertarians are disappointed and concerned with the
Court’s holding in Hiibel, most individuals will probably see little initial
change in their interactions with law enforcement. After all, laws that
compel the disclosure of a person’s identity have been on the books in
several states for years.167 If we trust the reasoning of the Hiibel Court,
we could very well believe that civil libertarian’s fears of police abuse
are unfounded. The Court noted that the police are only allowed to
compel identification of those who are under reasonable suspicion of a
crime where permitted by state statute.168 In addition, the Court has
placed a balancing test, however flawed, that indicates compulsory
identification is still subject to limitations.
Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis creates a new level of uncertainty
of individual civil rights for citizens who encounter the police. Does a
suspect of a crime have the right to remain silent? That depends. How
about a witness to a crime? How about someone who casually encounters
the police on the street and engages them in conversation? What about
persons who may find themselves in questionable situations, such as
protest marches, rallies, or at meetings of other dissidents? While most
people will probably err on the side of caution and willingly surrender
identification upon demand, there are those “rebellious” few who will
still hold on to the notion that one’s identity is no business of the police
unless there is probable cause to arrest them for a crime.
Perhaps the most sobering idea, one that appears to have been lost on

164. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
165. Id. at 17; Amicus Brief of the Cato Institute, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt
County, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
166. Id.
167. For example, Alabama’s (ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2003)) and Arkansas’s (ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2004)) corresponding codes have been in place since 1975. Colorado’s
(COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) (2003)) since 1983, and Delaware’s (DEL. CODE ANN. tit.11, §§
1902(a), 1321(6) (2003)) since 1953.
168. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humbolt County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004).
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the Court, is that even if the surrender of a person’s name may be a
relatively insignificant inconvenience, history has shown us that the
imposition of tyranny usually begins with slow, incremental
infringements on the liberties of the citizenry. If the Hiibel decision is
indicative of the post-September 11 Court’s mindset regarding civil
liberties, there is no telling how long it will be before police may compel
citizens to surrender other forms of personal information. It might not be
to far off when law enforcement may successfully argue it has a
compelling interest in knowing a person’s travel itinerary, home address,
Social Security number, and/or medical information.
The descent from a free state to a police state is usually not abrupt.
Liberties and freedoms are usurped quietly, out of “necessity”, and
usually with the consent of the citizens. For that reason, the struggle of
Larry D. Hiibel to remain silent in the face of authority is important.
Representative Ron Paul (R-TX.) made this observation about the
citizenry to Congress: “[t]olerance of inconvenience to our liberties is not
uncommon when both personal and economic fear persists. The
sacrifices being made to our liberties will surely usher in a system of
government that will please only those who enjoy being in charge of
running other people’s lives.”169
Any American citizen who does not take their privacy rights for
granted should be concerned about the Hiibel holding and the logic used
to arrive at it. Any American citizen who expects to be able to keep silent
in the face of menacing government authority should likewise be
concerned about Hiibel. The slippery slope to totalitarianism and the
police state is not as far as one might think.170 All we, as citizens, need
do to hasten our arrival at that dark place is to allow those constitutional
safeguards, such as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, to be whittled
away, little by little; a willing sacrifice upon the alter of liberty in
exchange for the promise of safety and security.171

169. See Ron Paul’s Speeches and Statements, Is America a Police State? available at
http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2002/cr062702.htm.
170. Whatever physiological or psychological malformation may occur in one individual
human being, may potentially occur in any other. The same applies to whole nations: the lesson of
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia is not how far Germans or Russians could fall, but how far human
beings-all of us-can fall, if critical rationalism, traditional ethics, religious values, or constitutional
government have been sufficiently weakened or destroyed. RICHARD VETTERLI & WILLIAM E.
FORT, JR. THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION 3 (1st ed. 1968) (citing WILLIAM EBENSTEIN,
TOTALITARIANISM, NEW PERSPECTIVES 4 (1st ed. 1962)).
171. “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety,
deserve neither Liberty or Safety.” Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the
Governor, Nov. 11, 1755, in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed.,
1963).
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